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The symposium on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods in the Winter 1984 issue of The International
Lawyer' presents an admirable collection of distinguished commentators on
the Convention, but they tell only one side of the story. A casual reader
might be left with the impression that the Convention is noncontroversial
and should be routinely ratified by the United States. This would be a very
unfortunate impression, for there are significant problematic issues regard-
ing the Convention and it would be of doubtful wisdom for the United States
to adopt it in its present form. These defects certainly will become apparent
when a broader cross section of the legal community becomes familiar with
the Convention's details. A thorough assessment of the Convention's im-
pact by the legal and commercial communities interested in international
sales transactions is overdue. I have set forth my concerns more fully
elsewhere;2 in this comment, I only suggest three central defects in this
far-reaching Convention that indicate its ratification should be delayed
pending clarification and further study.
I. Scope of the Convention and Strategy of
Law Harmonization by Codification
The Convention seeks to unify the law of sales of different nations by
breaking off international sales from general commercial transactions and
creating a uinified set of rules to cover such sales. This strategy can only work
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if it is possible to isolate international sales from other transactions and if it is
feasible to give them separate commercial and legal treatment. To the
extent that this goal is not practical, the law confronting businesspersons will
not be unified; it will be complicated by giving them two sets of disparate
rules to contend with.
The shortcomings of this strategy are demonstrated by the several de-
cades of difficulty the drafters had in defining an "international sale" and the
unworkable nature of their final solution. Professor Farnsworth's article in
your symposium3 mentions the definitional features in passing, but gives the
reader no clue to their complexity. In fact, the definitional provisions of the
Convention do not use the words "international sale." Instead, the Conven-
tion applies to all "sales of goods between parties whose places of business
are in different states."' This creates a law of personal status, which depends
on the place of business of the parties, not on any quality of the transaction.
If a Paris-based United States citizen purchases goods in New York that will
be resold in the United States without ever leaving the warehouse and will
never cross a national boundary, the Convention treats the transaction as an
international sale. In contrast, if a businessman who is a national and
resident of Japan rents office space in this country, his purchase of identical
goods to be shipped halfway around the world during the course of the
contract will not be treated as an international contract.
This curious way of defining the scope of the Convention is hardly
accidental. The motivation for harmonizing and unifying international sales
contract law is that the world economy is increasingly integrated and na-
tional legal borders no longer make clear commercial sense. The economies
of the developed world, and to a lesser extent the Socialist nations and the
developing world, are tied together by a high level of trade and investment.
The very circumstances that demand a higher level of legal harmonization
precludes isolating international transactions and subjecting them to differ-
ent rules than those that govern domestic agreements. Integration has
reached the point where international sales are neither a functionally nor a
conceptually distinct class of transactions in free market economies.
II. Substantive Inadequacies of the Convention and
Limits of Possible Compromise
How was it possible after over a half century of negotiation for the
delegates of sixty-two disparate legal cultures to reach agreement on a
3Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18 INT'L LAW. 19 (1984).
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Convention? It is no criticism to observe that the Convention is very much a
compromise. The problem is that in their anxiety to reach an agreement the
delegates often buried problems without resolving them, cut off their messy
ends, or adopted a verbal formula which hides persistent disagreement.
Sometimes these "compromises" are contained in clauses that even leading
participants in the drafting process cannot explain. Other times they are
contained in exclusions which undercut the universal and exclusive claims of
the Convention. Sometimes, they are found in formulations that are un-
likely to give the American lawyer a clue as to the meaning the terms will be
given by persons from other legal systems.
I cannot dissect the many substantive clauses of the Convention in this
brief comment, but it is regrettable that the distinguished authors of the
symposium in their more extensive treatments of important aspects of the
Convention did not tell us more about some of the following: a) the extent to
which the term "validity of the contract" in Article 4(a) imports national
concepts of illegal contracts, mandatory terms, unconscionability, duress,
capacity, mistake etc.; b) the extent to which the unification worked by the
Convention extends to problems of products liability, particularly claims of
third parties or those involving personal injury; c) the extent to which the
term "observance of good faith" in Article 7(1) means something compara-
ble to the similar term "obligation of good faith and fair dealing" under the
UCC, and the extent to which that term instead imposes a limitation on the
power of the parties to terminate negotiations without penalty before an
agreement is reached; d) the extent to which Article 78 excuses performance
because of inflation or other changes in price levels.
The list can be extended several fold and undoubtedly will provide fodder
for generations of law review article readers. The point is that a set of
modern sales contract rules that do not provide guidance on the legal risks of
product liability, inflation and other supervening events, tender and con-
formity of goods, and any other topic which has been the subject of manda-
tory national legislation cannot claim to be a workableunification of the law.
In short, those who support this Convention because it will clarify and
simplify the legal questions of sales transactions are in for a big surprise. The
exclusions and questions left open include almost all of the areas that are
currently controversial and produce disputes. This is hardly a shocking
revelation. Just how were the delegates supposed to be able to resolve these
profound substantive disagreements? In fact they did not and the appear-
ance of harmony is illusory. Having recognized that this is so, one must then
ask what good will be accomplished by adopting the Convention.
III. The Convention and the Future
The most problematic aspect of the Convention structure is the way it
deals with the future. In their zeal to unify sales law the drafters have created
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a comprehensive and exclusive code and have cut it off from national
processes of lawmaking without providing workable international substi-
tutes. It is as if once agreement is reached on the doctrinal statements of
contract law, the text will be a static and unchanging monument.
This is both unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it is
easier to accept an unsatisfactory text if one is confident that it can be
improved with experience. Conversely, when opportunities for further
growth are stunted, one's expectations of the original text must be higher. It
is unnecessary that opportunities for growth be so limited because there are
an impressive variety of opportunities drawn from experience with other
conventions and uniform laws in the United States and Europe which would
have enabled flexibility and growth. Harmonization by such means is not
always neat or speedy, but it is effective and possible.
In contrast, adoption of the Convention will eliminate the legislative
competence of the states which have successfully governed this area of law
for several centuries and will constrain the power of the federal government
to adopt amendments or modifications in the Convention text. Yet the
Convention establishes no international body to consider modifications.
UNCITRAL provides no mechanism for ongoing review and lacks authority
to propose changes in the Convention text to signatory nations. In fact,
UNCITRAL has no established procedures of clear authority to take any
action on its own. It operates under a process of unanimous consent,
perhaps because it has never been able to agree on rules of procedure and, as
Professor Honnold has described it, "the procedures bear a striking re-
semblance to those of a Quaker meeting."'
Each signatory is obliged to follow the interpretations of the others,
although no process is established to decide which national decisions are
authoritative and must be emulated by the other signatories. These inter-
pretative difficulties are particularly troubling since most of the signatories
of the Convention have legal systems that do not accord court decisions the
dispositive authority which they are supposed to have in common law
systems. Ratification will commit the United States to the regime estab-
lished by the Convention with little possibility of returning to the existing
flexible system of state law if the experiment proves unsatisfactory.
Finally, it should be noted that the Administration proposes to effect this
epochal shift in power from the states to the national and international
regimes not by an Act of Congress, but by the simple process of Senate
ratification of a treaty. This unorthodox method of incorporating a private
law treaty in domestic law precludes the kind of careful committee examina-
tion in both Houses and the review of the specific text in an authoritative
5Honnold, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and
Methods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 210 (1979).
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English version that has been used in the adoption by this country of earlier
private law Conventions.
Readers of The International Lawyer will profit from reading the sympo-
sium in the Winter 1984 issue and will benefit from the explanations it
provides. Careful study of the text of the Convention itself will raise impor-
tant questions in the readers' minds that should lead to more critical consid-
eration of this far-reaching innovation.
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